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THE CUBAN CONUNDRUM: PROPOSING AN
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK REGISTRY FOR
WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN MARKS
INTRODUCTION
[A]voidance of consumer confusion is the ultimate end of all
1
trademark law.

Wealthy tourists who possess an affinity for slot machines, blackjack, and
roulette may be familiar with the Casino de Monte Carlo. Since 1863, the
casino, operating under its namesake trademark,2 has promoted the allure of
Monaco. The casino’s trademark is registered in Monaco, but not in the United
States.3 Seizing upon the lack of a U.S. trademark registration, operators of
online gambling websites developed software that exhibited pictures of the
Casino de Monte Carlo’s interior and exterior and alluded to Monte Carlo’s
distinctive geographical location, relying on the casino’s noteworthy features
to advertise their own online products.4 The owners of the Casino de Monte
Carlo trademark challenged this use of the mark when they became aware of
these potentially infringing web sites.5 In International Bancorp, LLC v.
Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, the Fourth
Circuit determined whether a foreign trademark unregistered in the United
States could still receive protection from infringement.6
In analyzing the dispute, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, for the use of an
unregistered mark in foreign trade to merit Lanham Act protection,7 the mark
must be distinctive among U.S. consumers.8 The court determined that, even
1

Int’l Bancorp LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359,
381 (4th Cir. 2003).
2 Id. at 361.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 385 (“Until today, every court to address this issue has held that use of a foreign trademark in
connection with goods and services sold only in a foreign country by a foreign entity does not constitute ‘use
of the mark’ in United States commerce sufficient to merit protection.” (emphasis in original)).
7 The Lanham Act governs trademark law in the United States. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006). The
test for trademark infringement is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
8 Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 363 (citing Sara Lee Corp v. Kasyer-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir.
1996)) (finding that the degree of protection received by a mark is directly related to its level of
distinctiveness).
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without a demonstrated connection to use within the United States, a foreign
mark deemed “famous” should be protected because trademark laws are
designed to minimize consumer confusion.9 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
held that the online gambling websites infringed the Monte Carlo casino’s
trademark because the use of similar domain addresses and pictures of the
actual casino would cause confusion among ordinary consumers.10
In an analogous fashion to how Monaco’s noteworthy casino has helped
bring fame to the principality, Cuba has achieved renown for its popular brands
of rum and cigars. While Cuba’s products are distinctive among the cigarsmoking and rum-imbibing segments of the public, the U.S. court system has
failed to provide Cuban trademarks with the same protections as the Casino de
Monte Carlo in Monaco.11 The reason for this dissimilar treatment may be that
Monaco possesses an open trading relationship with the United States,12 while
Cuba has been considered an adversary for five decades.13
The lack of protection for well-known Cuban marks stems from the trade
embargo between the United States and Cuba.14 Both nations are members of
treaties that embody international intellectual property principles,15 but U.S.
courts have consistently ruled that U.S. domestic law codifying the embargo
outweighs the treaty obligations of the United States in conforming to
international intellectual property law.16 Realizing that Cuban marks tied to
Castro’s communist government face strict restrictions in the United States,
companies such as Bacardi and General Cigar have seized on this opening in

9

Id. at 381.
Id. at 381–82.
11 Compare Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005), with Int’l
Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 381.
12 The principality of Monaco encompasses less than one square mile, but became known for Hollywood
glamour after actress Grace Kelly married Prince Rainier in 1956. Principality of Monaco, NATIONS ONLINE,
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/monaco (last visited Mar. 17, 2011). Monaco also was known as a tax
haven where clients could place their assets to evade taxes in their home country, but the principality recently
adopted international standards for banking openness after pressure from the United States and Europe. See
David Jolly, As Tax Havens Acquiesce, Monaco Adopts Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/worldbusiness/16haven.html.
13 The Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2011) (codifying the trade embargo against
Cuba).
14 Id.
15 See discussion of the Paris Convention and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
16 See, e.g., Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 476–77 (finding that granting the injunctive relief
sought would effect a transfer of property rights to a Cuban entity in violation of the embargo, and that this
limitation on judicial authority applies to Lanham Act and Paris Convention claims).
10
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the marketplace and trademarked their own versions of Havana Club rum and
Cohiba cigars.17 When the United States lifts the trade embargo with Cuba,
trademark questions regarding several of these disputed marks will remain.18
The analysis of the U.S.-Cuba trademark disputes can provide guidance for
the future in weighing how a country should balance its international politics
with its obligations under intellectual property law. This Comment argues that
countries set a dangerous precedent when they rely on temporary political
considerations to block well-known foreign trademarks or interfere with
internationally agreed-upon intellectual property rights. This Comment
searches for a feasible solution that would prevent a country from violating
international intellectual property treaties by registering its own version of a
well-known foreign mark—thus leading to consumer confusion about the
source and origin of the mark—simply because a political relationship has
deteriorated between the country of registration and the country of the foreign
mark’s origin. Because avoidance of consumer confusion is the ultimate
purpose of trademark law, this Comment advocates for an international,
centralized registration system for well-known foreign trademarks. This
international registry would provide protection for well-known foreign marks
in a worldwide marketplace and not subject the marks to retaliatory actions
during wars, embargoes, or other conflicts.
First, in Part I, this Comment analyzes relevant trademark law in discussing
how a mark achieves the “well-known” status that entitles it to enhanced
protection under international law based on intellectual property principles.
The Comment also examines recent attempts to provide well-known marks
with greater international protection and describes the European Union’s
innovative trademark approach. Next, Part II explores the two most famous
trademark disputes of the past decade between the United States and Cuba. The
analysis explains how U.S. courts relied on domestic law rather than on
international intellectual property treaties in ruling on the disputes—a decisionmaking process that could be the subject of scrutiny once the current trade
embargo between the two nations ends. In Part III, this Comment addresses the
implications of applying a separate standard to well-known trademarks
17

See id. at 476 (focusing on the dispute over registration of the Cohiba mark for cigars); Havana Club
Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 119–22 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the history of the disputed
Havana Club rum mark).
18 See Will Weissert & Michael Felderbaum, Trademark Wars: US Goods Carry Famous Cuba Brands,
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubArticleDBR.jsp?id=
1202465773636&hbxlogin=1.
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originating in Cuba, and discusses how this approach places the United States
at odds with other countries. Finally, this Comment assesses how adding a
proposed amendment calling for international trademark registration to the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement19
would affect the ongoing U.S.-Cuba trademark controversy.
I. WELL-KNOWN MARKS: LEVELS OF PROTECTION AT HOME AND
INTERNATIONALLY
A. An Exception to the Territoriality Principle Within the United States?
The territoriality principle serves as an important tenet of trademark law by
providing that a trademark maintains a separate existence in every country
where it is registered.20 The doctrine allows each country to determine its own
statutory scheme for applying trademark rights.21 In the United States,
exclusive trademark rights can be claimed only through priority of use under
the Lanham Act, which means that the mark must be used in conjunction with
the sale of goods or performance of services within the United States’s
borders.22 Foreign use generally is not sufficient to establish priority of use
within the United States.23 The priority of trademark rights in the United
States, therefore, does not rely on priority of use anywhere in the world.24
The well-known marks doctrine, however, serves as an exception to the
rule that only priority of use establishes trademark rights within the United
States. In his treatise on trademark law, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy defines
the well-known marks doctrine as follows: “If a mark used only on products or
services sold abroad is so famous that its reputation is known in the United
States, then that mark should be legally recognized in the United States.”25
19

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
20 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004); 5 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:2, at 29-7 to -10 (4th ed.
2008).
21 See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:3, at 29-12 (citing Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565,
1568–59 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
22 See Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that mere advertising of a foreign
trademark in the United States did not constitute use in commerce under the Lanham Act).
23 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:3, at 29-11.
24 Id. § 29:2, at 29-7; see also Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1568 (finding that relying on use of a mark in
Japan in an attempt to support a claim for priority of use in the United States does not establish priority of use
because foreign use has no effect on U.S. commerce).
25 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:4, at 29-14.

PAVA GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 10:52 AM

THE CUBAN CONUNDRUM

635

Thus, in rare cases, a trademark can receive protection even if the mark has
failed to be used in commerce within the borders of the United States. This
Subpart contrasts two recent cases where courts gave more credence to the
well-known marks doctrine with the typical determination that the doctrine
does not exist under federal law.
1. Protection for Well-Known Foreign Marks
Two recent cases have shed new light on the well-known marks doctrine,
as both holdings oppose the majority rule that the well-known marks doctrine
does not exist as a matter of federal law. In De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v.
DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc.,26 the plaintiff used its trademark for more
than a century in connection with the diamond business, adopting the slogan
“A Diamond Is Forever” for advertising purposes.27 The plaintiff alleged
trademark infringement when the defendants registered thirty-four Internet
domain names that included the words “De Beers” and also registered the
namesake mark for use in purchasing diamonds.28 The defendants argued that
the plaintiff had not used the mark in commerce in the United States;29
however, the plaintiff asserted that the mark had achieved the requisite level of
fame within the United States to be entitled to the protection of the well-known
marks doctrine.30 The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Lanham Act Section
43(a), the defendants’ use of the mark served as a “false or misleading”
description of fact that would be likely to “cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship or approval
of . . . goods.”31

26 De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4099 (DLC), 2005 WL
1164073 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005).
27 Id. at *1.
28 Id. at *2.
29 Id. at *6. De Beers had failed to establish itself in the United States because of a decades-long antitrust
case where the diamond producer was accused of price-fixing and other anticompetitive conduct. See Stephen
Labaton, De Beers Agrees to Guilty Plea to Re-enter the U.S. Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/10/business/de-beers-agrees-to-guilty-plea-to-re-enter-the-us-market.html.
After facing antitrust cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1945, 1957, and 1974, De Beers left
the American market and resorted to using intermediaries to bring its diamonds into the country. Id. Because
the company based its operations overseas, the Justice Department had no jurisdiction and was unable to
continue its price-fixing prosecution. Id. However, in July 2004, De Beers agreed to plead guilty to criminal
price-fixing, a move that could potentially pave the way for the company to return to the United States. Id.
30 De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *6.
31 Id.; see also Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
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In its decision, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted that a split in authority existed as to whether the well-known marks
doctrine applied in U.S. federal courts.32 The Second Circuit has not yet
recognized the well-known marks doctrine, as the court has read the federal
statute to require “use in commerce” for an unregistered trademark in which a
plaintiff claims a protectable interest.33 However, the District Court decided to
apply the well-known marks doctrine in the De Beers case, calling the doctrine
“a narrow but justified exception to the territoriality principle.”34 The court
cited policy implications in holding that the doctrine should be applied in the
De Beers case as long as the mark had achieved an appropriate level of fame.35
The court saw the need to protect a legitimate foreign-owned business from
having its trademarks usurped by “pirates” who rush to register an existing
mark on their own goods.36 According to the court, this usurpation of goodwill
could pose a particular problem as international commerce increases. The court
stated: “Recognition of the famous marks doctrine is particularly desirable in a
world where international travel is commonplace and where the Internet and
other media facilitate the rapid creation of business goodwill that transcends
borders.”37
In Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., the Ninth Circuit
became the only federal circuit court to apply the well-known marks
doctrine.38 The Ninth Circuit examined whether the mark “Gigante,” which a
chain of grocery stores in Mexico used for several decades,39 had achieved a
sufficient level of fame among Mexican-Americans in California to give the
mark protection in the United States.40 Although the Mexican store’s mark had
32 De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *8 (“There is little case law on the famous marks doctrine from
federal courts generally, and the cases that exist vary in their conclusions . . . . Only one federal circuit has
applied the doctrine to date.”).
33 Id. at *7 (citing Buti, 139 F.3d at 102–03) (applying the use-in-commerce inquiry to a foreign entity
seeking trademark protection in the United States and finding that, under Lanham Act Section 43(a), a party
must establish prior use and ownership to prove its trademark is entitled to protection).
34 De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *8.
35 Id. at *8–9 (holding that it remains a question of fact whether De Beers’s namesake trademark has
achieved the requisite level of the fame in the United States to qualify as a famous mark and merit protection).
36 Id. at *8.
37 Id.
38 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); see also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d
135, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only federal appeals court to have
recognized the famous marks doctrine as a matter of federal law.”); De Beers, 2005 WL 1164073, at *8.
39 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V., 391 F.3d at 1091. The court stated that Grupo Gigante had almost
100 stores in Mexico by 1991. Id.
40 Id. at 1091–93.
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never been used in commerce in the United States,41 the store asserted its
trademark rights under the well-known marks doctrine when a San Diegobased store attempted to use the same “Gigante” mark.42 In holding for the
plaintiff, the court ruled that, to qualify as a well-known mark, a trademark
must have obtained more than just “secondary meaning” in the relevant
market; instead, the mark must be recognized by a substantial number of
persons within that market.43 In explaining the well-known marks exception to
the customary rule of territoriality, the Ninth Circuit held:
While the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important
doctrine within trademark law, it cannot be absolute. An absolute
44
territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would promote
consumer confusion and fraud. Commerce crosses borders. In this
nation of immigrants, so do people. Trademark is, at its core, about
45
protecting against consumer confusion.

According to the holdings in De Beers and Grupo Gigante, a trademark from a
foreign country—regardless of use within the U.S. borders—can be enforced
within the United States if the mark reaches well-known status due to its
reputation and established goodwill, even if the mark has never been used in
commerce or registered within the country.46 In Grupo Gigante, the Ninth
Circuit expounded on other factors that courts should consider in determining
whether a mark is well known. The court considered whether the defendant
intentionally copied the mark and the likelihood of consumer confusion in the
United States if a reasonable number of consumers expected they were buying
the product connected with the mark’s foreign owner rather than the new
domestic product.47 However, acceptance of the well-known marks doctrine as
an exception to the territoriality principle as a matter of federal law remains
primarily limited to the foregoing cases.

41

Id. at 1091.
Id. “Gigante Market” opened two locations in San Diego, the first in 1991 and the second store in
1996. Id.
43 Id. at 1093–94.
44 Courts often refer interchangeably to the “famous marks” doctrine and the “well-known” marks
doctrine. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:61, at 29-204.
45 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V., 391 F.3d at 1094.
46 Id. at 1094–95; De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. V. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4099
(DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:61, at
29-204.
47 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098 (finding that the factors are relevant to determining whether a mark
is well known because “they bear heavily on the risks of consumer confusion and fraud, which are the reasons
for having a famous-mark exception”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:4, at 29-15 to -16 & n.5.
42
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2. No Federal Protection for Well-Known Foreign Marks
Despite the holdings in the two preceding cases, a majority of courts in the
United States have ruled that the well-known marks doctrine does not exist as a
matter of federal law and such marks should only receive state law
protection.48 In 2007, the Second Circuit examined the U.S. trademark
registration of “Bukhara” for a restaurant in the case of ITC Ltd. v.
Punchgini.49 The mark was associated with an international chain of Indian
restaurants, which some magazines reviewed as the best Indian dining
establishments in the world.50 However, a dispute existed about whether ITC,
the corporation that owned the international chain of restaurants, had
abandoned its rights to the mark in the United States when the New York City
and Chicago restaurants bearing the mark closed.51 The defendants
subsequently opened their own version of the restaurant and attempted to use
the trademark “Bukhara Grill.”52 The court noted “numerous similarities
suggestive of deliberate copying”53 between the international Bukhara
restaurants operated by ITC and the new establishment. The plaintiffs brought
an infringement suit and argued they retained the trademark rights because the
mark had achieved sufficient worldwide renown, even if the mark had been
abandoned within the United States following the closure of the two dining
establishments in New York and Chicago.54
In rejecting the plaintiff’s claims, the Second Circuit analyzed specific
Lanham Act provisions dealing with registered marks and found that the Act
never references the well-known marks doctrine.55 The court found that the
48 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 159 (2d Cir. 2007); see also De Beers, 2005 WL
1164073, at *8 (finding that the Ninth Circuit is the only federal circuit court to apply the famous marks
doctrine to date); Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959)
(suggesting that recognition of the famous marks doctrine derives from state common law, based on a theory
of unfair competition or misappropriation, and not from the Lanham Act or other federal law).
49 Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 135.
50 See id. at 143. In 2002 and 2003, the Bukhara restaurant in New Delhi was named one of the world’s
fifty best restaurants by London’s Restaurant magazine. See id.
51 Id. The Manhattan restaurant closed in 1991 and the Chicago restaurant closed in 1997. Id. ITC
conceded that “it has not owned, operated or licensed any restaurant in the United States” bearing the
“Bukhara” mark since the Chicago restaurant closed. Id.
52 Id. at 144.
53 Id. The court found that, in addition to the similar name, Bukhara Grill mimicked the original Bukhara
restaurant’s logo, décor, staff uniforms, menus, and customer bibs. Id.
54 Id. at 142, 154. ITC argued that it had continuously used the Bukhara mark outside the United States
since 1977 and that the mark had achieved renown inside the United States even before it opened two
restaurants in New York and Chicago. Id. at 154.
55 Id. at 164.
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“absence of any statutory provision expressly incorporating the famous marks
doctrine . . . is all the more significant”56 because Congress has made its intent
known through a multitude of amendments to the Lanham Act but never
specifically addressed well-known marks.57 Although the Ninth Circuit
justified the famous marks doctrine as a matter of sound policy in Grupo
Gigante, the Second Circuit held that it could not deviate from the “basic
principle of territoriality” without congressional action amending the Lanham
Act to provide for a well-known marks exception.58 Therefore, the court
reasoned, even though the “Bukhara” mark had attained significant use in
commerce abroad, the plaintiff’s failure to use the mark within the United
States allowed the owners of the newer Bukhara Grill restaurant to obtain
priority rights in the mark at home.59 Other courts within the Second Circuit
also have rejected the view that the well-known marks doctrine should serve as
an exception to the territoriality principle in federal trademark law.60
B. Well-Known Marks in International Treaties
Several international conventions and treaties have described, as well as
strengthened, the well-known marks doctrine. This Subpart first discusses
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement as notable
international frameworks historically used by courts in determining what
constitutes a well-known mark. The Subpart next describes more recent
standards, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Joint
Recommendation, that provide a clearer definition for how a mark obtains
well-known status. The Subpart concludes by weighing the benefits and
disadvantages of the European Union’s Community Trademark Regulation and
argues that while greater harmonization across borders occurs in a unified
trademark registration system, the European Union’s current approach contains
several loopholes that still could promote confusion among well-known marks.

56

Id.
See id. (“We are mindful that Congress has not hesitated to amend the Lanham Act to effect its intent
with respect to trademark protection, having done so almost thirty times since the statute took effect in
1947.”).
58 Id. at 165.
59 Id.
60 See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that only Congress, and not the courts, can incorporate the well-known marks doctrine into the
Lanham Act); see also Buti v. Impressa Perosa S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that no rights
in the mark “Fashion Café” were created when an Italian company advertised its restaurant in the United
States).
57
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1. The Paris Convention and Article 6bis
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was the first
international treaty to govern patents, trademarks, and unfair competition
law.61 The Paris Convention developed as an “effort to standardize and
simplify the protection of intellectual property rights.”62 It emphasizes the
principle of “national treatment,” which allows foreign nationals to receive the
same protections in each of the Convention’s member countries as the country
provides for its own citizens.63 The majority of courts in the United States have
ruled that the Paris Convention is not self-executing,64 but it has been
incorporated into U.S. law through the Lanham Act, which focuses on the
principle of “national treatment” by allowing foreign nationals to receive the
same protection against unfair competition as provided to U.S. nationals.65
Article 6bis in the Paris Convention stipulates that trademarks that have
achieved well-known status in member countries may be protected within any
other signatory state, even if the trademark in question has not demonstrated
use in commerce in the other signatory state.66 Article 6bis prohibits
registration of a trademark within a signatory state if the mark “constitutes a
reproduction, imitation or translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark
considered . . . to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a
person entitled to the benefits of the present Convention and used for identical
or similar goods.”67 The language therefore provides that each signatory state
of the Paris Convention must forbid the registration of new marks that could
create confusion with existing marks already well known within the state, even
if those existing well-known marks have not been used within the state’s
borders.68 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention attempts to protect trademark
holders of all member countries by providing that mark holders receive the

61 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
62 BARBARA K. MÜLLER, MULTINATIONAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL
TRADEMARK REGISTRATION TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE 45 (2002).
63 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:25, at 29-91 to -92.
64 See Int’l Café v. Hard Rock Café Int’l, 252 F.3d 1274, 1277 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The Paris
Convention is not self-executing because, on its face, the Convention provides that it will become effective
only through domestic legislation.”).
65 Lanham Act § 44(h).
66 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 61, art. 6bis. See generally
MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:25, at 29-91 to -94.
67 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 61, art. 6bis.
68 See id.
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same treatment when seeking trademark protection in other member states.69
While Article 6bis stops short of creating an international trademark registry, it
seemingly offers wide protection for foreign well-known marks. The United
States is one of 173 countries that are members of the Paris Convention.70 By
ratifying the Paris Convention, these countries have agreed to block—within
their borders—the registration of new marks that could cause confusion with
existing well-known marks originating in other member states.71
2. TRIPS
Similarly to Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement,
which was signed into law in 1994, also recognizes the well-known marks
doctrine.72 TRIPS does not attempt to define “well-known marks,” but permits
different nations to develop their own standards for determining what
constitutes a well-known mark.73 Similarly to the Paris Convention, which
mandates national treatment for trademarks among all member states, TRIPS
advocates for standardized trademark treatment by obligating all World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) member countries to adopt the national-treatment
approach.74 In examining whether a mark is well known, TRIPS states that
each governing body may analyze “knowledge of the trademark in the relevant
sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has
been obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark.”75 This language
highlights a stark contrast between TRIPS and the Paris Convention. While
TRIPS focuses on protecting marks within a “relevant sector of the public,” the
Paris Convention mandates that a trademark must achieve well-known status

69

See id.
For a list of the contracting state parties to the Paris Convention, see Contracting Parties: Paris
Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_
id=2 (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
71 See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:25, at 29-93.
72 TRIPS, supra note 19, art. 16.
73 See id. art. 16(2).
74 Id. art. 3(1). Pursuant to Article 3:
70

Each member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than
that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to
the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne
Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits.
Id.
75

Id. art. 16(2).
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within an entire country.76 Despite this provision, which seems to offer greater
protection to marks because the mark must qualify as well known within only
one sector of the public, TRIPS still fails to designate criteria for determining
how a trademark qualifies as a well-known mark. This lack of guidance led
countries to develop varying approaches as to what constituted a well-known
mark, and many pushed for a clearer standard.77
3. Recent Frameworks for Protecting Well-Known Marks
a. WIPO Joint Recommendation
In formulating a clearer standard sought by many nations, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) recommended factors in 1999
that formed a new framework for recognizing well-known marks.78 The nonbinding WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks listed these factors, which are introduced in
this Subpart, and expanded on the well-known mark requirements set forth in
the Paris Convention and in TRIPS.79 The drafters of the Joint
Recommendation intended to harmonize the international protection of wellknown marks;80 however, the Joint Recommendation departs from the
traditional notion of territoriality by calling for trademarks to automatically
achieve well-known status in a member state if the trademark is well known
among relevant consumers in that state.81 Actual use of the mark within a
country’s borders is not necessary for protection, as the major point of
examination is whether the mark has developed a reputation within a relevant
segment of the public.82 This standard, therefore, uses similar language to
TRIPS in focusing on “the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in
76 Alexis Weissberger, Comment, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An International
Perspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739,
754 (2006).
77 See id. (finding that the unclear nature of the well-known marks doctrine served as the impetus behind
the WIPO Joint Recommendation, as member nations needed a consistent standard in applying the doctrine).
78 Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, World
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Doc. 833(E) (Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter WIPO Joint
Recommendation], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pdf/
pub833.pdf.
79 Id. art. 2; see also TRIPS, supra note 19; Paris Convention, supra note 61, art. 6bis.
80 See WIPO Joint Recommendation, supra note 78, Preface (“The Recommendation is the first
implementation of WIPO’s policy to adapt to the pace of change in the field of industrial property by
considering new options for accelerating development of international harmonized common principles.”).
81 Id. art. 2.
82 See id.

PAVA GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 10:52 AM

THE CUBAN CONUNDRUM

643

the relevant sector of the public.”83 Furthermore, as part of a framework for
defining when a mark has reached “well-known” status, the Joint
Recommendation’s factors call for a non-exhaustive examination of: (1) the
degree of recognition of the mark; (2) the duration, extent, and geographical
area of the mark itself; (3) the duration, extent, and geographical area of any
use, advertising, or publicity of the mark; (4) the duration and geographical
area of any registration of the mark; (5) the extent to which the mark is
recognized as well-known by authorities; and (6) the value associated with the
mark.84
In addition to determining whether a mark qualifies as well known within a
member state, the Joint Recommendation also offers a mechanism for
prioritizing conflicting marks. Through Articles 3(1) and 4(1)(b), the Joint
Recommendation provides that registration should be denied if a mark offered
for registration within a member state conflicts with a mark that already has
achieved well-known status within the territory.85 This denial should occur if
the new mark damages the interests of the holder of the well-known mark, or
impairs, dilutes, or takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the
well-known mark.86 Moreover, the Joint Recommendation advocates for
analyzing bad faith as part of the determination as to whether a well-known
mark has been infringed, as “cases involving the protection of a well-known
mark very often involve an element of bad faith.”87 Authorities such as the
International Trademark Association have concurred with the WIPO Joint
Recommendation that a determination of bad faith should be considered when
balancing competing claims to a well-known mark because “inconsistent
application of rules for protection of well-known marks has fostered public
deception and represents an obstacle for well-known mark holders. This
threatens investment and honest trade.”88
Although the factors listed in the WIPO Joint Recommendation create a
series of considerations to be weighed in determining whether a mark has
83

Id. art. 2(1)(b).
Id.
85 Id. arts. 3(1), 4(1)(b).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 17. The explanatory notes accompanying the WIPO Joint Recommendation call for taking “bad
faith” into account when balancing the interests of the trademark holder of the well-known mark with the
interests of a third party. See id.
88 See Amicus Letter of the International Trademark Association in Intel v. PT Panggung Electronic
Industries, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1514, 1522 (2002) (regarding Intel v. PT Panggung Elec. Indus., Supreme
Court of the Republic of Indonesia, case no. 590PK/PDT/2001 (2001)).
84
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achieved well-known status, the Joint Recommendation serves as a nonbinding guideline and is viewed as international “soft law.”89 However, nations
in the midst of revising their own trademark regimes can choose to base their
new laws on principles inherent in the WIPO Joint Recommendation. For
example, many provisions added to Singapore’s updated Trade Marks Act in
2004 were adopted from the WIPO Joint Recommendation, including a new
section designed to determine whether a mark is “well known” within the
country.90 Singapore directly adapted Article 2(1)(b) of the WIPO Joint
Recommendation in listing the factors that must be taken into account to infer
whether a mark has achieved well-known status in Singapore.91 Therefore,
although the WIPO Joint Recommendation is considered soft law, its emphasis
on promoting a clearer standard for what constitutes a well-known mark can
serve as a valuable model for nations interested in reforming their trademark
laws to further prevent consumer confusion.
b. The European Union Approach
The European Community treaty emphasizes the importance of the free
movement of goods across the borders of European states. The treaty provides
that the European Community shall exist as “an internal market characterized
by the abolition . . . of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital.”92 To bolster the free movement of goods, the European
Community Trademark Harmonization Directive, adopted in 1989, attempts to
streamline the differing trademark laws of European Community member
states.93 The Harmonization Directive, therefore, targets the disparities that
exist within the laws of member states but does not establish a central system
for European trademark regulation.94
89 See Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All There Is?: Beating Global Monopolists At Their Own Marketing
Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 123, 146–47 (2008) (finding that the WIPO Joint Recommendation
serves as a powerful harmonizing tool among member countries but is considered soft law because the Joint
Recommendation is not directly binding on any member countries).
90 See Burton Org, Protecting Well-Known Trade Marks: Perspectives from Singapore, 95 TRADEMARK
REP. 1221, 1226 (2005).
91 See id.
92 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty] art. 36; see also EEC Treaty art. 3, para. 1(a), (c).
93 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws
of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) [hereinafter Harmonization Directive].
94 See Eric P. Raciti, The Harmonization of Trademarks in the European Community, 78 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 51, 63 (1996) (finding that the Harmonization Directive focused on affecting national
regimes of different member states, while the Community Trademark regulation established a central
trademark administration).
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The Directive requires all member states to incorporate several provisions
in their trademarks, and it also recommends other optional laws to unify
existing national laws that could be construed as blocking the free movement
of goods.95 Under the Directive, all member states must adhere to the same
criteria for: (1) refusing to register a mark;96 (2) conferring exclusive use in
identical marks and prohibiting the use of any mark which could create a
likelihood of confusion with the initial user’s mark;97 and (3) revoking a mark
if the mark’s use serves to mislead the public, particularly as to the nature,
quality, or geographical origin of the goods.98
Five years after making national trademark laws more uniform through the
implementation of the Harmonization Directive,99 the European Community
adopted the Community Trademark regulation, which established a framework
for a community-wide trademark that receives protection in all member
states.100 The new regulation was not intended to supersede the Harmonization
Directive; instead, the two laws are meant to work in tandem to provide for
streamlined national laws as well as for a common trademark system at the
community level.101 According to the European Council regulation that created
the Community Trademark, “trade marks need to be created which are
governed by a uniform Community law” for the purpose of opening up
“unrestricted economic activity in the whole of the common market,” but the
community trademark law “nevertheless does not replace the laws of the
Member States on trade marks.”102
i. Benefits of the European Union’s Community Trademark
The Community Trademark functions by allowing a business to file a
single application to register its trademark throughout the European Union
(“EU”), meaning that the sole application is the only requirement necessary to
protect a mark against potential infringers.103 Differing local standards for
95

See Harmonization Directive, supra note 93, pmbl.
Id. art. 3(1).
97 Id. art. 5(1).
98 Id. art. 12(2)(b).
99 The Harmonization Directive was adopted in 1988, while the Community Trademark regulation was
adopted in 1993. Id.; Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark,
1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation (EC) 40/94].
100 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99.
101 See GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 129 (1996).
102 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99, at 802.
103 See Douglas D. Hancock, The Frontier-Free European Union: European Community Trademarks Hail
a New Day for Intellectual Property Laws, 56 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19, 19 (1996).
96

PAVA GALLEYSFINAL

646

6/28/2011 10:52 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

trademark enforcement—such as varying provisions for registrations, transfers,
and revocations—no longer apply at the community level, as one trademark
registration retains effect across borders.104 The desire to rid the trademark
application process from confusing international standards served as a major
impetus behind adopting the Community Trademark, as the Council stated:
“[A Community trademark] shall have equal effect throughout the Community:
it shall not be registered, transferred or surrendered or be the subject of a
decision revoking the rights of the proprietor or declaring it invalid, nor shall
its use be prohibited, save in respect of the whole Community.”105
The EU now encompasses twenty-seven countries,106 so the Community
Trademark system often saves an applicant money, time, and effort by only
requiring one application for the benefit of protection across twenty-seven
nations.107 Therefore, a well-known mark created and registered in one
European nation is automatically protected by all nations in the EU economic
zone, even without use in commerce or evidence that the mark had attained a
requisite level of reputation or goodwill. Furthermore, the advantages extend
beyond applicants from the twenty-seven member states of the EU. Any
national of a country that has ratified the Paris Convention, or operates an
industrial or commercial establishment in a Paris Convention nation, is eligible
to apply for, and to potentially receive, a Community Trademark.108
ii. Potential Disadvantages of the European Union System
In analyzing the European system, some commentators have determined
that the Community Trademark improves efficiency,109 and others have
provided application statistics showing that Europe’s intellectual property
community has embraced the system.110 However, other scholars have noted
104

See id. at 20.
See Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99, at 805.
106 The 27 Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-membercountries/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) (listing the current EU countries, as well as the candidates
for future membership).
107 See Martin J. Beran, Single Trademark Application for the European Community, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11,
1995, col. 1, at 1.
108 TRITTON, supra note 101, at 146.
109 Scott A. McKenzie, Global Protection of Trademark Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparison of
Infringement and Remedies Available in China Versus the European Union, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 529, 541–42
(1999) (finding that the European Community Trademark system has improved efficiency in protecting
trademarks across the region as long as the mark has been used in one country).
110 See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:35, at 29-114 to -115. From 1996 until 2001, the Office received
about 42,000 applications per year. Id.
105
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potential disadvantages in the creation of a system that promotes one
trademark across the entire European Community. Commentators have argued
that a Community Trademark could conflict with prior rights and still lead to a
likelihood of confusion.111 For example, if a national trademark holder has
obtained trademark rights in a specific locality, the mark’s owner still can
retain the rights in that locality if another applicant later obtains a Community
Trademark and gains the rights to the mark in the remainder of the European
Community’s member states.112 If the goal of the Community Trademark
system is to create a uniform marketplace for the free movement of goods
across borders, allowing several similar trademarks to coexist in different local
regions seemingly would conflict with that aim and lead to confusion in the
eyes of the public.
Others have questioned how the expansion of the EU would impact
trademark rights, especially if a person within a new member state previously
has registered a mark within the new member state’s borders that conflicts with
an existing Community trademark.113 The potential solution of allowing both
the new member state’s mark and the Community mark to remain in place—
rather than invalidating one of them retroactively—would further detract from
the unifying purpose of the Community Trademark system. This dual
trademark system also seemingly would lead to a high level of consumer
confusion. This Comment later addresses how it might be unfair to compare an
international registry to the European Community’s trademark model because
of inherent structural differences.114
II. A CASE STUDY: ANALYZING WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN MARKS THROUGH A
CUBAN NEXUS
Cuba is an island nation located only ninety miles south of Florida,115 but
relations between Cuba and the United States have been far from neighborly.

111

See TRITTON, supra note 101, at 159.
Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, supra note 99, art. 107 (providing that a national trademark holder of
a mark can prevent the Community Trademark from being used in the locality where he has previously
obtained rights, but the Community Trademark would govern in the rest of the Community).
113 See TRITTON, supra note 101, at 159–60 (finding that when the EU expands and includes a new
member state that brings trademarks that are substantially similar to existing Community Trademarks, either
the Community Trademark would have to be invalidated, or the conflicting national mark would have to yield
to the Community Trademark).
114 See infra Part IV.A.2.
115 JAIME SUCHLICKI, CUBA: FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO AND BEYOND 3 (5th ed. 2002).
112
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The U.S. government has banned trade with Cuba for nearly five decades,116
following Fidel Castro’s rise to power in 1959.117 During his first years in
power, Fidel Castro canceled promised elections, suspended Cuba’s existing
constitution, seized property and business holdings for the government without
compensation, and began the process of changing Cuba into a communist
country.118 The economic sanctions promulgated by the U.S. government
following the rise of Castro’s communist government—which some call the
most stringent embargo imposed by the United States on any nation in the
world119—have remained in place, cutting off trade, travel, and investments
between the two nations.120 The Cuban government estimates that the U.S.
trade ban has cost Cuba approximately $89 billion in the nearly five decades of
the embargo’s existence.121
Recently, however, a series of milestone events have generated a
heightened level of discourse about the future of U.S. policy toward Cuba.122
After several years as the interim leader, Raul Castro succeeded his brother123
as president of Cuba in February 2008,124 and Barack Obama was elected as
President of the United States in November 2008.125 These leadership changes,
116 See REESE ERLICH, DATELINE HAVANA 72 (2009) (discussing how every presidential administration
since Dwight D. Eisenhower has maintained economic sanctions against Cuba).
117 Id. at 137–38.
118 See Crystal Jamison, Family Tradition: Cuban Policy Reform as Raul Castro Takes the Reins, 15 LAW
& BUS. REV. AM. 891, 892 (2009) (citing Bradley T. Gilmore, U.S.-Cuba Compensation Policy, 8 TEX. HISP.
J.L. & POL’Y 79, 82 (2002)).
119 ERLICH, supra note 116, at 72 (finding that U.S. policy allows for citizens to travel to enemy nations
such as Iran and North Korea, but not to Cuba, and that no other country observes the embargo against Cuba).
120 The Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2011).
121 See ERLICH, supra note 116, at 75 (citing a Cuban-backed media article listing the economic effects of
the U.S. blockade).
122 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG., CHANGING CUBA POLICY—IN THE UNITED STATES
NATIONAL INTEREST v (Comm. Print 2009) (letter of transmittal of Sen. Richard Lugar, Ranking Member, S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations).
123 Because he was about to undergo surgery, Fidel Castro temporarily turned power over to his brother
and vice president, Raul, in late July of 2006. James C. McKinley, Jr., Fidel Castro Resigns as Cuba’s
President, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/world/americas/20castro.html.
Fidel never fully recovered, and he opted not to continue in office following the surgery. Id. Raul Castro’s
official election as president came in 2008, when the National Assembly voted him into the leadership position
permanently. See ERLICH, supra note 116, at 185.
124 This change in leadership is significant because some commentators viewed the likelihood of Cuba
opening up and moving away from communism under Fidel Castro as negligible. See SUCHLICKI, supra note
115 (“There has been no indication that [Fidel] Castro intends to truly open up the island’s political or
economic system or promote a peaceful solution to Cuba’s deepening crisis.”).
125 Adam Nagourney, Obama Wins Election; McCain Loses as Bush Legacy Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05campaign.html. Senator Richard Lugar wrote that
Raul Castro’s ascension to power and Obama’s election, coupled with the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban
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as well as President Obama’s promise during the presidential campaign to
examine the Cuban embargo by lifting restrictions on Cuban-American travel
to the island, have led some commentators to state that both countries have
entered into a time of reevaluation of their “complex relationship.”126 In April
2009, only three months after his inauguration, President Obama reached out to
Cuba by abandoning restrictions on Cuban Americans’ ability to travel to the
island and to send money to family members still living there.127 He called for
“a new day” in the tumultuous relationship between the nations, while
continuing to emphasize that he will not lift the trade embargo until Cuba
undertakes democratic reforms.128 In August 2010, the Miami Herald reported
that the Obama administration soon would announce an expansion of
“educational and cultural travel” to Cuba, as well as an easier method of
paying for telephone services in Cuba.129 Sources told the newspaper that the
easing of travel restrictions would serve as the Obama administration’s
response to an effort by the Cuban government to release more than fifty
political prisoners by September 2010.130
The controversial issue of Cuba’s political prisoners has served as only one
of several roadblocks encountered by President Obama as he attempts to
mitigate the embargo’s effect. In September 2009, Obama renewed the trade
embargo between the two nations for another year, leading the United Nations
(“UN”) General Assembly to pass a non-binding resolution condemning the
embargo for the eighteenth consecutive year.131 On December 5, 2009, the

revolution, have generated an increased level of discussion about the direction of U.S. policy toward the
island. See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 122, at v.
126 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 122, at v. Senator Richard Lugar wrote that the
relationship between the United States and Cuba can be viewed as complex because it has been marked by
“misunderstanding, suspicion, and open hostility.” Id.
127 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Damien Cave, Loosening Cuba Restrictions, Obama Leaves the Door Ajar for
More, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at A6. Even though it appears to be a modest step, the Obama
administration’s decision to lift restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives or sending money has been
called “the most significant shift in United States policy toward Cuba in decades” by some commentators. Id.
128 Obama Offers Cuba “New Beginning,” BBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2009, 6:17 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/8004798.stm (“The U.S. seeks a new beginning with Cuba. I know there is a longer journey that must be
travelled to overcome the decades of mistrust, but there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.”); see
also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Alexei Barrionuevo, Obama Declares U.S. Will Pursue Thaw with Cuba, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A1.
129 Juan O. Tamayo, U.S. Could Ease Restrictions on “Purposeful” Visits to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (Aug.
6, 2010), http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/08/06/v-print/1765507/us-could-ease-restrictions-on.html.
130 Id.
131 Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Embargo on Cuba Again Finds Scant Support at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2009, at A8 (reporting that despite President Obama’s moderate steps at easing relations, the UN vote in
support of the resolution shows that little has changed in regard to the international community’s view of the
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Cuban government arrested a U.S. subcontractor in Havana for distributing
telecommunications equipment.132 The Cuban government accused the
contractor of working as a spy for U.S. intelligence services, but the U.S. State
Department said his presence in the country was part of an effort to
“transition” Cuba to democracy by disseminating devices, such as computers
and cell phones, that could circumnavigate the government’s control.133 The
contractor’s arrest potentially could cause more trouble for the tenuous
relationship between the United States and Cuba, as Cuban leader Raul Castro
did not appear eager to establish closer ties with the United States when he
stated during a December 2009 speech following the subcontractor’s arrest that
“‘the enemy is as active as ever.’”134
The imprisonment of the subcontractor serves as telling evidence that Cuba
will not necessarily become a more hospitable place simply because Fidel
Castro has ceded power to his brother. Nicknamed “the Prussian,” Raul Castro
boasts a reputation as a “widely feared hard-liner” who has incarcerated scores
of political prisoners.135 A November 2009 investigative report by Human
Rights Watch documented more than forty cases in which Cuba has
imprisoned individuals for “dangerousness” under Raul Castro as the
individuals attempted to exercise their fundamental rights.136 The Cuban
Criminal Code defines “dangerousness” as any behavior that contradicts
socialist norms, and Cuba relies on the provision to imprison individuals
before they have committed a crime, simply based on the suspicion that they
might commit a crime in the future that runs contrary to “‘the ends of the
socialist state.’”137 According to the Human Rights Watch report, Cuba, under
Raul Castro’s leadership, violates human rights by operating as a “state that
uses repression to enforce conformity with its political agenda.”138
Officials with the U.S. State Department have cited Cuba’s human rights
record as justification for the continuing economic sanctions, stating that Cuba
economic blockade); see also ERLICH, supra note 116, at 72 (finding that every year since 1992, the United
Nations has voted by an overwhelming majority to condemn the embargo, with the 2007 vote tallying 184 to 4
against the United States).
132 See Frances Robles, U.S. Says Contractor Arrested in Cuba Is No Spy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 8, 2010,
available at 2010 WLNR 363589.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Jamison, supra note 118, at 904.
136 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEW CASTRO, SAME CUBA: POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE POST-FIDEL ERA 1
(2009), available at www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/18/new-castro-same-cuba.
137 Id. at 1–2.
138 Id. at 2.
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must free political prisoners, respect human rights, and create a mechanism for
free elections for the embargo to be lifted.139 Cuba’s treatment of imprisoned
political dissidents attracted widespread attention in February 2010, when a
jailed dissident died while protesting his detention with a hunger strike that
lasted more than two months.140 Family members of the prisoner, who was
labeled as a “prisoner of conscience” by Amnesty International, blamed the
death on Raul Castro’s government and said that prison officials also denied
the prisoner water while he engaged in the hunger strike.141
The Human Rights Watch report blames the Cuban government for the
country’s human rights abuses, but also finds fault with the international
community for failing to hold Cuba to its promises of change.142 For example,
Raul Castro authorized the signing of two UN human rights treaties
immediately after his formal ascension to the presidency, but neither treaty has
been ratified or implemented.143 The report argues that the restrictive economic
sanctions placed on Cuba by the United States have led to the unintended
effect of arousing sympathy for Cuba and distracting the international
community from the country’s human rights abuses.144 According to the report:
There is no question: the Cuban government bears full and exclusive
responsibility for the abuses it commits. However, so long as the
embargo remains in place, the Castro government will continue to
manipulate US policy to cast itself as a Latin American David
145
standing up to the US Goliath, a role it exploits skillfully.

Even if Cuba ends its repressive human rights policies, other disputes
between the United States and Cuba must be resolved before any easing of the
embargo is considered. In particular, ongoing trademark issues would need to
be addressed before the two nations could work toward normalizing
relations.146 During the embargo, several U.S. companies have used brand
names that originated in Cuba, as increasingly strict federal laws have barred
companies affiliated with the Cuban government from registering their

139 Press Release, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Aug. 25, 2006), http://nassau.usembassy.gov/pr_25082006.html.
140 Marc Lacey, Dissident’s Death Ignites Protest Actions in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at A7.
141 Id.
142 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 136, at 3–4.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 7.
145 Id.
146 Weissert & Felderbaum, supra note 18.
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products in the United States.147 Without the embargo in place to block the
Cuban entities’ claims to disputed trademarks, the clash over the rightful
ownership of these trademarks could stretch from the U.S. courts to Congress
to the boardrooms of some of the largest U.S. corporations.148 In particular,
disputes involving Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigars have spanned
approximately a decade each in litigation.149 Both the Havana Club rum and
Cohiba cigar cases illustrate the trademark friction that exists between the
United States and Cuba as a result of the trade embargo.
A. The Saga of Havana Club Rum
Before Castro’s ascension, Cuba boasted a thriving tourism industry.
Dissuaded from European travel during the carnage of World War I, wealthy
American tourists instead turned their attention to Cuba as a vacation
destination.150 The island’s popularity boomed in the early 1920s,151 following
the start of the Prohibition era in the United States.152 The accessibility of
flowing alcohol, coupled with Cuba’s sun, beaches, legal gambling, and
prominent prostitution industry, served as a strong allure.153 As one author
wrote, “Booze, gambling and sex. What more could a Yankee tourist ask
for?”154
1. One Family’s Role in the History of Havana Club Rum
The spirits industry became instrumental in promoting the island’s image
as an exotic and liberating vacation spot.155 The Arechabala family founded a

147 Id. The article lists Cohiba, Havana Club, Rico Habano, and Havana Honeys as Cuban labels now
produced outside of the island. Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 ALFREDO JOSE ESTRADA, HAVANA: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A CITY 158–60 (2007).
151 See ERLICH, supra note 116, at xi (discussing how the United States remained the leading power in
Cuba during the first half of the 1900s, and how wealthy Americans dominated the island through the sugar
industry, tourism, gambling, and prostitution).
152 Id. By the 1920s, Cuba boasted roughly 7000 drinking establishments. ESTRADA, supra note 150, at
160.
153 See ESTRADA, supra note 150, at 159 (“Prohibition virtually created the Cuban tourist industry, adding
plentiful rum to the allures of sun and sultry señoritas.”).
154 T.J. ENGLISH, HAVANA NOCTURNE: HOW THE MOB OWNED CUBA AND THEN LOST IT TO THE
REVOLUTION 12 (2007).
155 See ESTRADA, supra note 150, at 159.
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company in 1878 that began producing Havana Club rum.156 However, after
Castro assumed power in 1960, he confiscated all private property belonging to
Cuban nationals.157 The national government expropriated the Arechabalas’
distilleries and they subsequently left Cuba for Europe.158 However, Castro’s
1960 expropriation of business did not affect trademark registrations in the
United States, where the Arechabala family continued to own the registered
mark to Havana Club rum, even though they no longer had the capability to
actually produce the rum.159 In 1973, the Arechabalas allowed their U.S.
trademark registration to lapse, even though registration renewal would have
cost the family only twenty-five dollars.160
This abandonment allowed the Cuban government to register the “Havana
Club” mark three years later with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) in 1976.161 Although the embargo between the United States and
Cuba blocked trade, both countries upheld the intellectual property rights they
established at the Inter-American Convention.162 These rights permitted Cuban
trademarks to be registered in the U.S. PTO without issue, even though the
products associated with the trademarks were not available for sale within the
United States.163 Though Cuba was prevented from selling Havana Club rum
in the U.S. market, the country hoped its registration of the mark, and continual
timely renewals, would position it to sell Havana Club rum in a post-embargo
marketplace.164 In 1993, the Cuban government entered into a partnership with
Pernod Ricard, a French wine distributor, and later assigned the trademark to
Havana Club Holdings, a new company formed as a result of the joint
156 An Examination of Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Examination of Section 211 Hearing] (testimony of
Ramon Arechabala).
157 Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 119 (2d. Cir. 2000). When Castro seized
and appropriated the Arechabala family’s assets in 1960, the family never received compensation from the
Cuban government. Id. at 119–20.
158 Id. Ramon Arechabala, the great-grandson of the founder of Havana Club rum, stated that Castro threw
him in jail following Castro’s rise to power on December 31, 1959, and only released him under the condition
that he leave the country. See Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 8 (testimony of Ramon
Arechabala). The Arechabala family then immigrated to Spain. Id. He subsequently came to Miami in 1967
and became an American citizen. Id.
159 See id.
160 See Arian Campo-Flores, Rum Warriors, AM. LAW., Jan. 6, 2000, at 59.
161 Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 120.
162 General Inter-American Convention for Trademark & Commercial Protection pmbl., Feb. 20, 1929, 46
Stat. 2907 (listing Cuba as a signatory state).
163 See Carlos Enrique Alfaro, Panel #4: Intellectual Property and the Rule of Law, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 357, 376–77 (2008).
164 Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59.
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venture.165 The joint venture registered the “Havana Club” mark in more than
eighty countries,166 and worldwide sales of the rum doubled between the joint
venture’s start in 1994 and 1998.167
Understandably, the Arechabala family has long argued that the
confiscation by Castro’s government was an illegal appropriation of their
property and that it should retain all rights to Havana Club rum. In testimony
before a U.S. Senate committee, Ramon Arechabala recounted how armed
members of Castro’s government, on December 31, 1959, “took all my assets
and threw us out of the company and removed us from being able to go to
work at the company.”168 He showed his anger at the joint venture between the
Cuban government and Pernod Ricard by stating:
[W]hat happened to my family was wrong. We wanted to keep
selling Havana Club rum, but we were prevented from doing so
because of this confiscation of the distillery, this robbery of my
distillery, my business in Cuba. Castro’s wrong to me and my family
continues today because the Cuban/Pernod venture continues to trade
off Havana Club’s reputation with a product that can never be the
same Havana Club rum that we used to make. The government stole
169
my assets, my family heritage, and much of my children’s future.

In the mid-1990s, the Arechabala family partnered with Bacardi.170 Bacardi
paid $1.25 million for the supposed rights to the trademark, arguing that
because Castro’s nationalization of property was illegal, the family still
retained its rights to the “Havana Club” mark and possessed the ability to
assign it.171 Bacardi then began distributing its own version of the rum, made
in the Bahamas, in the U.S. market.172 This action led Havana Club Holdings,
backed by the Cuban government, to file a trademark infringement suit
claiming that Bacardi’s sales violated Havana Club Holdings’ trade name to

165

Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 120.
Anthony Gardner, A Rum Fight May Embarrass U.S., NAT’L L.J., Sept. 11, 2000, at A21.
167 Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59.
168 Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 8 (testimony of Ramon Arechabala).
169 Id. at 9.
170 Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 120; see also Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156,
at 8–9 (testimony of Ramon Arechabala) (testifying that the partnership with Bacardi only occurred because
Arechabala wanted to keep the rights to Havana Club rum, but needed a distillery that actually made rum in
order to do so).
171 Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59.
172 Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 121. From May to August 1996, Bacardi distributed 906 cases of
Havana Club rum in the United States, resulting in Havana Club Holdings’ decision to file an action in
December to enjoin Bacardi from using the “Havana Club” trademark. Id.
166
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Havana Club rum.173 Because the trademark rights to Havana Club rum were
claimed both by Bacardi (after it partnered with the founding Arechabala
family) and by Pernod Ricard acting on behalf of the Cuban government, the
dispute reached U.S. federal court.174
2. The Assignment of the Havana Club Trademark: Was It Valid?
Before analyzing the Havana Club rum litigation, it is necessary to examine
if Bacardi even possesses a valid claim to the “Havana Club” trademark. On
one hand, it seems clear that Bacardi could be viewed as a successor to the
mark because the mark originated with the Arechabala family, and the family
chose Bacardi to carry on its rum-producing legacy. However, such a theory
would ignore established trademark principles such as the consequences of
abandonment and excusable non-use.
Under the Lanham Act, a mark shall be deemed as abandoned when its use
has been discontinued with the intent not to resume such use, and non-use for
three consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.175
When the Arechabala family’s trademarks for Havana Club rum began to
lapse, the family needed to renew the U.S. mark to prevent the loss of its
rights.176 However, Ramon Arechabala stated that the family believed it was
only allowed to renew the marks if it was currently producing rum and actually
using the marks in commerce.177 Therefore, because the Arechabalas were not
using their mark in commerce, they believed renewal was impossible, and,
even after consulting a non-trademark specialist lawyer, they felt they had no
choice but to allow their U.S. registration for the mark to lapse.178 However,
the U.S. PTO provides for a narrow exception to use in commerce in allowing
for “excusable non-use” of a trademark.179 Because the Cuban embargo
qualifies as an excusable non-use, the Arechabalas faced a simple path for
keeping their registration of the mark.180 To prevent the mark from expiring,
the family only had to file an affidavit and pay a small fee.181 Instead, because
they were unaware of the “excusable non-use” exception, the Arechabalas’
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id.
See id. at 120–21.
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
See id.; Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59.
Campo-Flores, supra note 160, at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rights to the mark lapsed and the Cuban government applied for the
trademark.182
There exists a well-accepted norm against recognizing the confiscation of
property rights without compensation,183 and this Comment does not argue that
Fidel Castro’s government was morally justified to expropriate the Arechabala
family business and distillery in 1960 during the nationalization of all property
in Cuba. However, the Arechabala family should not be excused from
following established intellectual property principles—such as trademark
renewal—simply because they suffered when their real property was
confiscated. Such a decision would allow scores of other business owners to
also argue that they deserve some sort of exception for the registrations and
renewals of their trademarks. Despite his abhorrent human rights record,
Castro never seized the Arechabalas’ trademark to Havana Club rum; the
Cuban government earned it legally by applying to the U.S. PTO after the
family’s inaction caused its mark to expire. Therefore, the family had no legal
rights to the “Havana Club” mark when it transferred the mark to Bacardi. As a
U.S. senator framed the issue during a U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing, in which Ramon Arechabala was present:
I totally agree with you and the passion you expressed about
confiscation of property by Fidel Castro. That, in my opinion, is no
longer the issue here. Clearly, he confiscated the physical properties
of Havana Club. But the property right trademark resided in this
country, not in Cuba. It was registered here. And it appears that the
184
ability to re-register that with a $25 check did not happen.

3. Stronger Anti-Cuba Laws Impact Ruling in Havana Club Legislation
The end of the 1990s—the same time period as when the Havana Club rum
litigation began winding its way through the federal courts—also saw the
implementation of two federal laws that strengthened the Cuban embargo and
further frayed relations with the island nation. In 1996, Brothers to the Rescue,
a Cuban-American group based in Miami, flew two unarmed civilian airplanes
near the island for what it claimed was the purpose of spotting Cuban rafters

182
183
184

Id.
Bruce Lehman, A Victory of Law Over Politics, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 2000, col. 3, at 2.
Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 2 (testimony of Sen. Larry Craig).
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and informing the U.S. Coast Guard of the rafters’ locations.185 Cuba shot
down the aircraft over international waters, killing all four Brothers to the
Rescue members involved in the flights.186 As a punishment for this perceived
act of aggression, the U.S. Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, also known as the Helms-Burton Act.187
The law, supported and signed by the Clinton administration, dissuaded
foreign companies and nationals from investing in properties confiscated by
Castro’s communist government and prohibited executives in those companies
from traveling to the United States,188 among other restrictions aimed at
deterring foreign investments in Cuba. In particular, the act contained a
provision that gave Congress power over the embargo, removing the future of
the embargo from sole presidential control.189
In 1998, another provision affecting Cuba, Section 211, was inserted into
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act.190 Section 211(2)(b) states:
No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any
assertion of treaty rights by a designated national or its successor-ininterest under sections 44 (b) or (e) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15
U.S.C. 1126 (b) or (e)) for a mark, trade name, or commercial name
that is the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or
commercial name that was used in connection with a business or
assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of such mark,
trade name, or commercial name, or the bona-fide successor-in191
interest has expressly consented.

In summary, Section 211 prohibits the U.S. government from approving
trademarks in connection with businesses that have been previously
confiscated by any foreign government.192 In ruling on the “Havana Club”

185 SUCHLICKI, supra note 115, at 203. The Brothers to the Rescue group argued that its purpose was to
assist the U.S. Coast Guard, but on other flights over Cuban airspace, the group dropped anti-Castro leaflets in
Havana. See id.
186 Id.
187 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 11 Stat. 785 (1996)
(codifying the regulations implementing the Cuban embargo); see 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h) (2006).
188 SUCHLICKI, supra note 115, at 203–04.
189 ERLICH, supra note 116, at 53.
190 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105277, § 211(b), 112 Stat. 2681.
191 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 211(b).
192 Julie Kay, Cuba Libre Wars, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., July 28, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR
18284887.
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mark following the passage of this provision, the Second Circuit held that
Section 211 intended to block transfers of trademarks that had been previously
confiscated by Castro’s communist government, such as the “Havana Club”
mark.193 Accordingly, the court held that the Cuban government’s partnership
with Pernod Ricard could not receive any trademark rights enforced in a U.S.
court after the passage of Section 211, and Bacardi was awarded the right to
distribute Havana Club rum in the United States.194
4. The “Bacardi Bill”
The lobbying power of Bacardi195 helped lead to the passage of Section
211, as company representatives pushed lawmakers196 such as former Florida
Senator Connie Mack to enact a statute that would address trademarks in the
same vein as other property nationalized by Fidel Castro’s government.197 The
statute blocked the U.S. registration, renewal, or recognition of trademarks
confiscated by the Cuban government without the consent of the trademark’s
original owner.198 In addition, Section 211 denied Cuban nationals and their
successors access to the U.S. court system if they disputed trademark rights.199

193 Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 127 (2d. Cir. 2000) (finding that Section
211(b) applies because Havana Club Holdings is a designated national under Section 211(b), organized under
the laws of Cuba).
194 Id.
195 The Washington Post and Daily Business Review reported in 2002 that Florida Governor Jeb Bush
conducted a personal e-mail lobbying campaign on behalf of Bacardi, while the company gave tens of
thousands of dollars to the Governor’s reelection campaign and to the Florida Republican Party. Julie Kay,
Havana Club Patent Ruling Doesn’t Go Down Smooth, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 14, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 25547320. Also, campaign finance records show that Bacardi provided key lawmakers with
thousands of dollars in campaign contributions during the debate over Section 211’s passage. See Dan
Christensen, Friends of Bacardi: As Donations Flowed, Heavyweight Lawmakers Pleaded Spirits Giant’s
Case for Havana Club, 79 MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV. 1 (2004), available at 2004 WLNR 23370128. Christensen
reported that three powerful lawmakers sent letters to the Commerce Secretary on behalf of Bacardi. Id. After
sending those letters, Representative Tom Delay’s political groups received $43,000, Representative Henry
Bonilla’s leadership group received $10,000 and Senator Fritz Hollings’s leadership group received a $5000
contribution. Id.
196 Courts do not always react favorably to lobbying efforts by politicians, and sometimes the lobbying
backfires. In OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2009), the PTO only “grudgingly”
issued a trademark registration for OBX as an abbreviation for the Outer Banks, North Carolina after the
region’s congressional delegation intervened with an intense lobbying effort. Id. The court held that this
lobbying effort “undermined” whatever support OBX-Stock might try to claim from the registration. Id.
197 See Kay, supra note 195.
198 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act § 211(a)(2).
199 Id. § 211(b).
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Because of Section 211, Bacardi achieved its primary goal of maintaining
the “Havana Club” trademark. The courts sided with Bacardi in barring Pernod
Ricard and Havana Club Holdings from claiming the trademark to the rum, and
the U.S. trade embargo with Cuba was further bolstered by limiting the
communist government’s ability to profit from confiscated trademarks.200
Although the bill never specifically mentioned the Cuban embargo,
international trade experts believe that the provision was written for the sole
purpose of helping Bacardi secure the trademark rights to Havana Club rum,201
based on evidence of the intense lobbying effort conducted on Bacardi’s
behalf.202
The Second Circuit also ruled against Havana Club’s assertions that its
trademark infringement claim should be recognized under the Inter-American
Convention, a multilateral treaty of which Cuba, the United States, and ten
other countries are members.203 The court held that “[w]ith respect to the
Cuban embargo, the purpose of Congress could not be more clear. Congress
wished to prevent any Cuban national or entity from attracting hard currency
into Cuba by selling, assigning or otherwise transferring rights subject to
United States jurisdiction.”204 Because Havana Club rum was viewed as
property confiscated by the Cuban government, the Second Circuit held that
Section 211 prevented the use of the Inter-American Convention’s provisions
to support Havana Club rum’s trademark infringement claim.205 Section 211
served as the primary factor in the court’s decision, instead of international
intellectual property treaties.
Alleging that U.S. courts have used Section 211 to circumvent established
international intellectual property principles, European nations and the World
Trade Organization have called for substantial changes to the provision.206
200

Emily Taylor, The Havana Club Saga: Threatening More than Just Cuba Coke, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 513, 518 (2004) (citing Ashley C. Adams, Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act: The Threat to
International Protection of U.S. Trademarks, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 221–22 (2002)).
201 Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 12 (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman) (“[I]f you
read Section 211, it incorporates or references back to our embargo law and regulations, and they are
obviously addressed to Cuba.”).
202 Kay, supra note 192.
203 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:26, at 29-94; see also General Inter-American Convention for
Trademark & Commercial Protection, supra note 162 (stating that the countries adhering to the Inter-American
Convention of 1923 are Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
United States, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic).
204 Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 124 (2d. Cir. 2000).
205 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:26, at 29-94.
206 See infra Part IV.A.
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Although Congress has debated several “fixes” to Section 211 that would
better align it with international trademark standards, no action has been taken
yet.207 The objections of the WTO, as well as the legislative fixes to Section
211 debated by Congress, are analyzed in detail later in this Comment.208
B. Smoked Out: Trademark Dispute Over Cohiba Cigars
In addition to its spirits industry, Cuba has attracted international fame for
the high quality of its unique cigars.209 Cuban cigars have been called “perhaps
the world’s most revered,”210 and Cigar Aficionado Magazine estimates that,
even with the embargo’s trade restrictions, Americans still manage to consume
roughly twenty million Cuban cigars each year by purchasing them while on
vacation in other countries and bringing them back to the United States.211
Millions of dollars flow into Cuba annually from cigar exports, with one
official estimating that the country made $240 million from the cigar trade in
2003.212
One Cuban company responsible for producing such in-demand cigars,
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco (“Cubatabaco”), registered the “Cohiba”213 mark
in Cuba in 1969 and began selling the cigars outside of Cuba in 1982.214
However, because of the U.S. embargo blocking the importation of Cuban
goods, Cubatabaco never sold Cohiba cigars in the United States215 and
therefore failed to establish “use in commerce” within the country. Because
Cubatabaco never applied for a U.S. trademark, American-based General Cigar
Co. seized the opportunity in the marketplace and registered the Cohiba brand
as a trademark in the United States in 1981.216 The American company again
207

See infra Part III.B.
For a discussion of the World Trade Organization’s objections to Section 211, and the two legislative
fixes debated by Congress, see Part III.A–B.
209 But see Daniela Mohor, Socialism and the Cigar, in CAPITALISM, GOD AND A GOOD CIGAR 156–57
(Lydia Chavez ed., 2005) (finding that although Cuban cigars have enjoyed a “fine reputation” for decades, the
nation’s efforts to boost production of cigars to bolster its economy could be leading to a decrease in cigar
quality, as so many new and untrained workers are now employed in the cigar-making industry to meet the
demand for exports).
210 Alex Altman, A Brief History of the Cigar, TIME (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,1869320,00.html.
211 Tanya Batallas, Competing Cohibas Eye End of Cuban Trade Embargo, STAR-LEDGER (June 24, 2009,
7:04 AM), http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2009/06/competing_cohibas_eye_end_of_c.html.
212 Mohor, supra note 209, at 149.
213 Cohiba means “tobacco tree.” See Mohor, supra note 209, at 150.
214 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 464 (2d Cir. 2005).
215 Id.
216 Id.
208
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registered the mark in 1992217 as the cigar market grew in popularity and the
pent-up consumer demand for banned Cuban cigars among American cigar
aficionados peaked.218
When General Cigar began a marketing and advertising campaign in 1997
in an attempt to draw further attention to the brand, Cubatabaco brought suit,
claiming the Cuban trademark was “sufficiently well-known in the United
States that it deserved protection under the so-called ‘famous marks
doctrine.’”219 Although the district court found a likelihood of confusion
existed between the Cuban mark and the General Cigar mark for Cohiba
cigars,220 General Cigar relied on the embargo in its appeal to the Second
Circuit in arguing that Cubatabaco could not prove that use of its mark existed
within the United States.221
1. The Second Circuit’s Ruling
Although the district court originally sided with Cubatabaco and ordered
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to cancel General Cigar’s registration of
the “Cohiba” mark, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling.222
The Second Circuit did not focus on the well-known marks doctrine or on
trademark law in general in examining the district court’s decision. Instead, the
court relied on the U.S. embargo with Cuba and held that the case “implicates
an issue of significant public concern—the United States’[s] national policy
towards Cuba as established by the President and the Congress—and it
involves a question of pure law.”223 The court reasoned that even if
Cubatabaco acquired trademark rights in the United States for Cohiba cigars
through the well-known marks doctrine, the Cuban company’s rights would be
barred by the embargo.224 Accordingly, then, any discussion of the

217

Id.
See generally Joseph M. Perry et al., The Cuban Cigar Industry as the Transition Approaches, 8 CUBA
TRANSITION 414 (1998), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/ca/cuba/asce/cuba8/42perry.pdf (“World-wide
cigar production and consumption declined from a relative peak in the mid 1960s until the early 1990s. At that
time, consumers rediscovered large, premium cigars. The demand for these high priced products began to
increase . . . .”).
219 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 464.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 471.
224 Id. at 472 (“[W]e hold that the Embargo Regulations bar Cubatabaco’s acquisition of the U.S.
COHIBA mark through the famous marks doctrine . . . .”).
218
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applicability of the well-known marks doctrine became moot, because the
court determined that the embargo’s regulations governed.225
2. Embargo Trumps International Agreements, But For How Long?
The Second Circuit’s ruling placed U.S. foreign policy ahead of
international treaties and customary trademark law, and effectively stopped
Cubatabaco from seeking to claim the trademark within the United States until
after the embargo’s end. However, in December 2009, the parties returned to
court for another hearing before a Southern District of New York judge.226 The
court granted Cubatabaco’s motion for judgment on a state law claim of
misappropriation, finding that Cubatabaco was entitled to a hearing on the
issue of General Cigar’s bad faith.227 The court found that Cubatabaco was
entitled to relief for General Cigar’s misappropriation of its mark, stating:
[D]espite the fact that Cubatabaco is presently prohibited from selling
its cigars in the United States due to the on-going embargo between
this country and Cuba, Plaintiff has demonstrated that General
Cigar’s continuing misappropriation of the goodwill associated with
the COHIBA cigar is a wrongful act . . . . The mere fact that Plaintiff
does not sell in the United States does not prevent the Court from
granting an injunction where, as here, an ongoing misappropriation
228
results in the continuing devaluation of Plaintiff’s product.

The Southern District of New York therefore granted Cubatabaco’s request
for a permanent injunction blocking General Cigar from using the “Cohiba”
trademark on its cigars.229 However, the court stayed all relief pending General
Cigar’s appeal, after determining that General Cigar had demonstrated a
“substantial possibility” of success on appeal to the Second Circuit.230
Cubatabaco’s attorneys said the December 2009 ruling reinforced the
“equitable principle that one company should not be able to profit from what it
did not create.”231 However, the Second Circuit did not agree, as the appeals
225

See id. at 472–74.
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399, 2009 WL 4790410, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 14, 2009).
227 Id.
228 Id. at *2.
229 Id.
230 Id. at *4.
231 See Andrew Longstreth, Judge Enjoins Cigar Maker’s Use of Cohiba Name, AM. LAW., Dec. 18,
2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202436658473. Michael
Krinsky, an attorney from Rabinowitz Boudin, the law firm which represents Cubatabaco, made the statement.
Id.
226
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court overturned the injunction barring General Cigar from using the Cohiba
name in July 2010.232 The court determined that the Southern District of New
York should not have reopened the case on the grounds of examining the bad
faith of General Cigar.233 The ruling allowed General Cigar to continue selling
cigars under the Cohiba name in the United States and caused Cubatabaco’s
attorneys to examine the possibility of continuing the litigation before the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board.234
Beyond the Second Circuit’s decision, the fact remains that General Cigar
and other American cigar companies are paying close attention to a larger
issue: what a potential end to the embargo would mean for their businesses.
Even General Cigar’s own general counsel has commented that opening the
U.S. market to Cuban cigars when the embargo ends could jeopardize his
company’s bottom line.235 “The market is going to be turned upside down,”
said Gerry Roerty, the general counsel for General Cigar.236 “[Americans] will
buy a Donald Duck cigar if it’s a Cuban.”237 Similar to Bacardi’s lobbying
effort in the Havana Club rum trademark dispute, General Cigar has spent $5
million lobbying Congress to keep relevant trademark laws—and the embargo
as a whole—in place.238
III. A SEPARATE STANDARD FOR CUBAN MARKS?
Some commentators have argued that both the Havana Club rum and
Cubatabaco cigar decisions have established a separate set of principles that
govern trademark disputes with Cuba, because both court decisions relied on
the statutory language authorizing the U.S. embargo with Cuba.239 The 1996
Helms-Burton Act, Section 211, and the embargo itself effectively foreclose
Cuban businesses from seeking intellectual property rights in the United States,

232

Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., 385 Fed. Appx. 29, 30 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 32–33.
234 Alison Frankel, Give That Firm a Cigar! DLA Wins Second Circuit Over Sale of Cohibas, AM. LAW.,
July 22, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202463788678&slreturn=1&
hbxlogin=1. The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (“TTAB”) is an administrative body within the U.S.
PTO that hears certain kinds of trademark disputes. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/appeal/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
235 Batallas, supra note 211.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Michael Berry, Cigars and Rum: Hazardous to the Health of Intellectual Property Law?, 38 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 457, 477 (2007).
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and have resulted in a “higher-standard” for Cuban entities.240 In light of
substantial international opposition to the embargo, the question remains:
should the U.S. Congress and federal courts continue to hold Cuban
trademarks to a separate standard based on the embargo at the expense of
customary international intellectual principles?
A. Fight at the WTO: Does Section 211 Violate TRIPS?
In particular, Section 211241 has provoked significant international
opposition. The World Trade Organization received a complaint from the
European Union in September 2000, which alleged that Section 211 violated
the TRIPS trade agreement and requested a special WTO panel to investigate
the issue.242 Because the United States and Cuba are both signatory states of
TRIPS,243 the EU argued that Section 211 violated TRIPS Article 3(1), which
states that each member state “shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to
the protection of intellectual property.”244 Moreover, TRIPS also provides that
whenever a trademark is duly registered in the country of origin, the other
member countries of the WTO are obliged to accept and protect it.245 These
principles led to the EU’s position that, in enacting Section 211, the United
States discriminated against certain trademark owners of another member state,
and therefore failed to support the agreement’s objective of developing a
consistent enforcement mechanism for international intellectual property
rights, in violation of the United States’s obligations under TRIPS.246 In
response, the United States argued that TRIPS allows national law to
determine trademark ownership, as individual states still retain the right to
determine and recognize the owner of a trademark.247
In ruling on the complaint filed by the EU, the Appellate Body of the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body determined that the trademark sanctions in
Section 211 singled out Cuba for discriminatory treatment and therefore
240

See id.
See supra Part II.A.3–4 (discussing the controversial nature of Section 211).
242 Press Release, World Trade Org., Panel Set Up to Consider US Trademark Dispute (Sept. 28, 2000),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/dsbsep_e.htm.
243 TRIPS, supra note 19 (listing Cuba and the United States as signatory states).
244 Id. art. 3(1).
245 Id. art. 16.
246 Panel Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 4.132, WT/DS176/R
(Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Section 211 Panel Report].
247 Id. ¶ 4.238.
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violated TRIPS provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation
status.248 According to the WTO, this discrimination denied Cuban trademark
owners the chance to defend their rights in U.S. courts and therefore was
inconsistent with the TRIPS agreement.249
The WTO Appellate Body instructed the United States to bring itself back
into compliance with TRIPS, or risk the possibility of trade sanctions for
violating the agreement.250 However, the United States still had failed to
comply by June 2010, causing the EU to note that the United States had made
ninety-two presentations in the last decade on its plans to fix Section 211—
without actually complying.251 This lack of enforcement has angered Cuban
leaders. In a November 2009 appearance before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body, one official accused the WTO of setting a negative precedent: “It has
been more than seven years [since] the appellate body’s ruling . . . the parties
that . . . demand other countries’ strict adherence to intellectual property
rights . . . come to this body every month without even providing some
information on how and when they will comply with recommendations.”252
The United States continues to provide the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body
with status updates on its efforts to comply with the Section 211
recommendations, and the most recent report was presented on December 21,
2009.253 After a U.S. official reported that Congress and President Obama’s
administration are working to implement the recommendations, the EU noted
that the United States was presenting its eighty-sixth status report on its plans
to change Section 211 and that it “hoped that the new US authorities would
take steps to finally implement the [Dispute Settlement Board’s] ruling and
resolve the matter.”254 Furthermore, according to the summary of the meeting,
“Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and

248

Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Section 211 Appellate Body Report].
249 Kay, supra note 192.
250 Id. Under such sanctions, European countries would have the right to impose tariffs or limit exports
against the United States. Id.
251 Dispute Settlement: United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds176_e.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
252 See Statement Delivered by Rodolfo Reyes Rodríguez, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the Permanent Mission of Cuba, on Section 211 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, Nov. 19, 2009,
CUBA: SITIO OFÍCIAL EMBAJADA, http://embacuba.cubaminrex.cu/Default.aspx?tabid=11389 (last visited Feb.
6, 2010).
253 See Press Release, World Trade Org., DSB Establishes Panel to Examine China’s Export Restrictions
on Raw Materials (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/dsb_21dec09_e.htm.
254 Id.
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Paraguay all reiterated their continued concern over non-compliance.”255
Therefore, while the United States does not face the immediate threat of
retaliatory measures regarding its failure to fix Section 211, the international
community is growing increasingly frustrated with the continual delays.
B. Legislative Efforts to Fix Section 211
Although there is no immediate pressure on the United States to revise
Section 211 because of the EU’s decision to not press ahead with sanctions,
two legislative proposals have been advocated to bring Section 211 into
compliance with TRIPS and other international standards. The dueling
approaches pit the prospect of a “narrow fix” against a full-fledged repeal of
Section 211.256 Under the narrow fix approach, an amendment would tailor
Section 211 to rid the act of the problematic discriminatory language.257 The
amendment would change Section 211 to apply to all companies, even those
based in the United States, instead of being limited to foreign businesses.258
This slight change could perhaps solve the concern that Section 211
discriminates against foreign businesses. Two bills proposed in the 111th
Congress would incorporate this narrow change.259 The alternative proposal
advocates for a full repeal of Section 211 as the best way to bring the United
States into compliance with TRIPS.260 Both fixes have been discussed for
years, and the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on whether to revise
or altogether repeal Section 211 as recently as March 3, 2010.261
With an outright repeal of Section 211, the United States could again prove
that it honors its multilateral international agreements. Furthermore, the United
States would set a precedent by showing other nations that different nations
should honor each other’s trademarks—even if the two in question are not
allies for other political reasons.262 Bill Reinsch, president of the National
Foreign Trade Council, has called for a full repeal of Section 211 as a means of
the United States reasserting itself as an international intellectual property
255

Id.
Kay, supra note 192.
257 See id.
258 Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 16 (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman).
259 Id. at 12.
260 Id. at 7 (statement of Senator Lindsay Graham).
261 See Lesley Clark, Bacardi’s Fight to Retain Havana Club Name Resurfaces in Congress,
CUBAVERDAD (March 3, 2010), http://www.cubaverdad.net/weblog/2010/03/bacardis-fight-to-retain-havanaclub-name-resurfaces-in-congress/.
262 Kay, supra note 192 (quoting Bill Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council).
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leader.263 In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Reinsch stated that the United States exports the most products, and therefore,
has the most to lose if a weak international regime fails to protect trademark
rights.264 “‘The U.S. has been the world leader in arguing for intellectual
property . . . . [Section 211] has destroyed our moral authority.’”265
Unlike its human rights abuses, Cuba’s actions in the intellectual property
arena have not resulted in outrage from the international community. Cuba has
consistently upheld trademark protections, despite tense political relationships
with other nations. Trademarks from U.S. companies have long been honored
in Cuba, and the Cuban government has refused to register marks that Cuban
companies have applied for that serve as substantially similar versions of U.S.
trademarks for Jell-O and Kraft, for example.266 Despite the embargo, more
than five thousand U.S. trademarks have been registered in Cuba,267 as
businesses want their mark protected from trademark pirates and anticipate the
ability to do business in Cuba immediately following the embargo’s end.268
Because the United States is the world’s intellectual property leader, the
nation has the most to lose if other countries decide to violate established
trademark practices. The Cuban government has upheld U.S. trademark
protections in the past, causing the passage of Section 211 and the Second
Circuit’s ruling in the Havana Club rum case to anger Fidel Castro. In a May
1999 speech, Castro threatened to create a trademark for a Cuban version of
Coke,269 which he viewed as an infringement of a U.S. trademark in the same
way that U.S. companies are authorized to violate established Cuban
trademarks such as Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigars.270 If the Cuban
government halted the recognition of U.S. trademarks, Cuba could become a
haven for trademark pirates who steal American marks. While Cubans argue
that such a move would simply treat U.S. trademarks in the same way that the
United States manages marks originating in Cuba, that type of reprisal would
be devastating for U.S. businesses because of the substantial profit earned
abroad from intellectual property exports.

263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 5–7 (testimony of William R. Reinsch).
See Kay, supra note 192.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Fidel Castro stated, “Caramba, let’s taste Cuban cola.” Id.
Id.

PAVA GALLEYSFINAL

668

6/28/2011 10:52 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

Intellectual property exports play a prominent and increasingly significant
role in the U.S. economy, as one trade organization estimated that U.S.
intellectual property exports to foreign markets accounted for $126 billion in
2007, an eight-percent jump in comparison to the previous year.271 Intellectual
property foreign sales exceeded the foreign sales of other notable U.S.
industries, such as aircraft, automobiles, and agricultural products.272
Intellectual property-related industries, furthermore, accounted for 6.44% of
the entire gross domestic product of the United States.273 Because intellectual
property-related exports, and their corresponding trademarks, serve as such a
vital part of the U.S. economy, the United States cannot afford to have its
intellectual property threatened and subjected to reprisals.
C. The Second Circuit’s Decisions on Cuban Trademarks Violate
International Law Norms
In both the Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigar cases, the Second Circuit
reached decisions despite the fact that international law norms do not offer a
set guideline for comparing treaties with domestic federal law. The U.S.
Constitution authorizes the President to engage in treaties with the advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate.274 However, the U.S. Constitution also states that
federal statutes and international treaties are accorded equal standing and
provides that federal courts have the power to decide cases arising under both
federal law and international treaties.275 In addressing this issue of state
sovereignty, there is no clear authority as to whether U.S. courts should adhere
to the principles in international intellectual property agreements such as
TRIPS, or whether federal laws passed in support of the embargo take
precedence.
1. Should the Last-in-Time Rule Still Apply?
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the Constitution,
federal law, and the treaties of the United States all are superior to laws passed
by individual states; however, no specific priority is provided as to federal law
271 See Press Release, Int’l Intellectual Prop. Alliance, Fact Sheet: Copyright Industries in the U.S.
Economy: The 2003–2007 Report (July 20, 2009), http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA2009Report2PageSummary.
pdf.
272 Id. (finding that while foreign sales of intellectual property totaled $126 billion in 2007, sales of
aircraft totaled $95.6 billion, automobiles totaled $56.8 billion, and agricultural products totaled $48.1 billion).
273 Id.
274 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
275 Id. art. III, § 2; see MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 29:33, at 29-104.
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and treaties.276 Therefore, the Constitution itself does not directly guide courts
as to whether an international treaty is superior to federal law.277 Because
neither form of law is distinctly stated as supreme, customary international law
has adopted a last-in-time rule where courts view treaties and federal law as
equal and give controlling power to whichever is most recent,278 which allows
Congress to pass a federal law, such as Section 211, that overrides a treaty. In
the United States, courts use the last-in-time rule when federal statutes and
international treaties oppose each other.279 Under this last-in-time approach,
Section 211’s later passage would prevail over the TRIPS agreement and other
international intellectual property treaties. Case law also supports the last-intime notion, finding that where a treaty and a later-enacted federal statute
conflict, the later-enacted statute governs over the treaty, since the Constitution
does not delineate an order of preference between treaties and federal
statutes.280
Some commentators, however, argue that the growth of international trade
in recent decades has fostered a marked increase in multilateral treaties and
other forms of international cooperation, which have helped to underscore the
importance of a nation’s international reputation.281 The last-in-time rule,
decided more than a century ago,282 would seem inconsistent and outdated in
this new era. If a federal law permits Congress to modify and restrict a prior
international treaty, the United States could be subject to a backlash from

276

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Michael A. Namikas, Comment, Up in Smoke? The Last in Time Rule and Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 643, 665 (2008).
278 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“[I]f there be any conflict between the stipulations of
the treaty and the requirements of the law, the latter must control . . . if the two are inconsistent, the one last in
date will control the other.”).
279 See Namikas, supra note 277, at 653–54 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (using the last-in-time rule to settle a conflict between a treaty with
China and a federal statute concerning immigration)).
280 See S. African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that Section 306(a)(2) of
the Anti-Apartheid Act is specific enough to unambiguously call for revoking the permits granted to South
African air carriers under a 1947 treaty governing air service between the two countries) (citing Chew Heong
v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884) (stating that repeals of treaties by federal statutes are not favored,
but can occur when the “later provision is certainly and clearly in hostility to the former . . . if harmony is
impossible, and only in that event, the former law is repealed.”)).
281 See, e.g., Namikas, supra note 277, at 644–45 (“[T]he Last in Time rule has become outdated
precedent in a global security increasingly reliant on multilateral treaties.”).
282 See generally Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581.
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scores of trading partners,283 and the nation’s leaders must weigh the potential
impact of those reprisals against the desire to continue adhering to the last-intime principle.
By overriding the Paris Convention and TRIPS in favor of strengthening
the embargo with Cuba, the United States has ignored its obligations under
international law, and in turn, has violated an agreement it previously ratified
with more than one hundred other nations. Because international agreements
have fundamentally changed since the era of the last-in-time rule’s adoption,
this idea should not always govern when analyzing the interplay between a
conflicting treaty and federal law. If the last-in-time norm were vacated in
select instances, courts would not be bound to rule that Section 211 outranked
the TRIPS agreement, and therefore, courts could incorporate longstanding
intellectual property principles when making trademark dispute decisions. A
nation’s leaders should use a balancing test in determining whether the
reprisals that could come along with violating an international treaty justify the
application of the last-in-time rule in giving precedence to a more recent
federal statute instead of the treaty obligations.
2. Does Section 211 Erode the United States’s International Standing?
Since Fidel Castro’s ascension to power, U.S. policymakers have
considered Cuba a strategic threat.284 However, no other countries observe the
U.S. embargo with Cuba,285 and the UN General Assembly has voted to
condemn the embargo by a substantial margin every year since 1992.286 At a
time when the United States needs as many allies abroad as possible, some
have argued that the United States has further isolated itself by deviating from
international intellectual property principles in favor of upholding the Cuban
embargo. In passing Section 211 in particular, Bill Reinsch of the National
Foreign Trade Council argued that the United States has set a poor standard in
telling the rest of the world that limiting trademark protection is appropriate
based on solely political reasons.287

283 See Namikas, supra note 277, at 679–81 (arguing that abolishing the last-in-time rule would lessen the
loss of reputation that occurs when the United States ignores its international commitments in favor of relying
on a more recent domestic law).
284 See ERLICH, supra note 116, at 31.
285 Id. at 72.
286 See id. In 2007, the United Nations vote was 184 to 4 against the U.S. embargo with Cuba. Id. The
only countries voting with the United States were Israel, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. Id.
287 Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 5–7 (testimony of William R. Reinsch).
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Section 211, in effect, we believe, tells the world that it is okay to
limit trademark protection in certain obviously political
circumstances. There are no doubt a lot of other countries who would
welcome that message and would be happy to use it as an excuse to
remove trademarks in situations that are politically important to them.
288
This is not a message that we should be sending.

Although this Comment is not calling for international agreements to
invariably supersede federal law, given that fundamental issues of state
sovereignty would be impacted by such an assertion, states should engage in a
balancing test. In weighing the loss of reputation and prestige in the
international intellectual property community versus the effect on national
security in weakening the Cuban embargo, or at least allowing the country to
have some level of trademark registration ability within the United States for
its well-known marks, the United States has determined that federal law takes
precedence over its international obligations.
However, perhaps the United States can compromise in a way that allows
for the condemnation of Cuba’s human rights record without sacrificing its
international standing as an intellectual property leader. It is possible for the
United States to repeal Section 211 without loosening the other restrictions
inherent in the Cuba embargo. A full repeal of Section 211289—and not the
narrow fix that would only rid Section 211 of its discriminatory language290—
would allow the United States to become fully compliant with the provisions in
the TRIPS agreement, and show the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body that
lawmakers have taken action to propose the changes requested in the appellate
body’s ruling of more than seven years ago. The repeal of Section 211 would
reestablish the same framework for the registration of foreign well-known
marks that existed in the first four decades of the Cuban embargo. The Cuban
government would possess the ability to register trademarks associated with
nationalized businesses with the U.S. PTO, but only to the extent that those
businesses would retain priority rights to the marks in a post-embargo
marketplace. Because the embargo as a whole would still exist, no company
associated with Cuba’s communist government would be able to sell its
product within the United States; however, the companies would not lose their
intellectual property rights to their well-known marks before the embargo is
lifted. Furthermore, in conjunction with the repeal of Section 211, the United
288
289
290

Id. at 7.
S. 2002, 108th Cong. (2003), is the Senate bill calling for a full repeal of Section 211.
S. 2002, 108th Cong. (2004), pushes for a narrow fix to Section 211.
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States should strongly condemn Cuba’s recent human rights abuses, such as
the continued imprisonment of political opponents291 and the hunger-strike
death.292 An intellectual property compromise from the United States is not a
carte blanche for Cuba to behave however it wants in the human rights arena,
and the United States should make that clear.
IV. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGISTRY FOR
WELL-KNOWN MARKS
Although a repeal of Section 211 would repair the United States’s
international standing regarding its protection of well-known Cuban marks, it
seems obvious that a similar dispute could arise between other nations with a
deteriorating political relationship. To ensure that countries do not allow
temporary political expediency to infringe on each other’s customary
trademark rights, this Comment proposes the creation of an international
registry for well-known marks as an amendment to TRIPS. This amendment
for a well-known mark registry, if ratified by TRIPS’s signatory states, would
serve as a more widespread solution in preventing countries from using
political reasons as justification for interfering with intellectual property rights.
A. Standardized Framework for Well-Known Marks
First, to be considered for status as an internationally registered wellknown mark, a mark would have to meet a standardized definition of “wellknown” that would exist among all nations that have ratified the amendment.
Both the WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks, and the European Union’s Community
Trademark framework, provide guidance on how such a system should be
developed.
1. Advantages of Following the WIPO and EU Approaches
The WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection
of Well-Known Marks establishes a workable framework for determining
which marks have achieved a sufficient level of fame to be characterized as
“well-known.”293 Under this framework, an independent commission would
first determine if the mark had established a degree of knowledge or
291
292
293

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 136.
See Lacey, supra note 140.
WIPO Joint Recommendation, supra note 78.
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recognition in the relevant sector of the public.294 The well-known marks
commission would be comprised of representatives from each state that had
approved the amendment to TRIPS, and each state’s representative would
serve on a rotating term so that the total number of commissioners would not
be overly cumbersome at any given time.295
In analyzing whether a mark conflicts with a separate, existing mark, the
commission would use Article 4(1)(b) of the Joint Recommendation in its
examination of whether the mark constitutes a reproduction or imitation of the
well-known mark, and whether using the mark would likely unfairly impair or
dilute the distinctive character of the well-known mark.296 Similarly to the
EU’s trademark framework, once a mark were registered in one member state
and achieved well-known status there, it would automatically achieve wellknown status in every country that had ratified the amended TRIPS
agreement.297
2. Applying Havana Club and Cohiba Marks to the Amended Framework
Using Havana Club rum as an example, the commission could rule that the
Cuban government’s joint venture with Pernod Ricard that expanded Havana
Club’s sales and marketing to numerous countries caused the rum’s mark to
achieve a high degree of knowledge or recognition. The relevant test would be
to determine if worldwide consumers associated the mark with the specific rum
exported from Cuba. The commissioners then would decide if another
company aiming to use Havana Club as its trademark would dilute the
character of the well-known mark because consumers would automatically
associate the rum with its Cuban origins. If the commissioners opted to use the
European Community Trademark System as a model, Havana Club rum would
garner well-known status in all member states because Cuba is a signatory of
TRIPS, and a well-known mark that exists in one member state would attain
the same protections from all member states, even if the mark had yet to be
used in commerce within every state’s borders.
Similarly, with Cohiba cigars, the commission first would analyze if a
relevant sector of the public associated the mark with its Cuban origins, or if
the public instead believed that the mark had a stronger, non-Cuban tie to
294
295
296
297
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See id.
Id. art. 4(1)(b).
See supra text accompanying notes 99–108.
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General Cigar. If it was determined that the mark achieved its renown because
of its association with Cuba, then commissioners would need to partake in a
subsequent dilution analysis. The commissioners would decide if General
Cigar’s use of the mark would impair the character of the well-known mark
because consumers would be confused about the true origins of the cigars and
possibly refrain from purchasing a cigar with questionable ties to Cuba. Again,
if the commission used the European Community Trademark System as a
guide, it is likely that Cohiba cigars would achieve well-known status in all
member states that had ratified the amendment, because Cuba is a signatory of
TRIPS, and TRIPS provides that a well-known mark existing in one member
state would attain the same protections from all member states, even without
use in commerce.
Overall, because the public seeks Havana Club rum and Cohiba cigars
primarily based on the Cuban origin of the products, it its likely that these
marks would be construed as well known under an international registry and
substantial weight would be given to the marks’ association with Cuba. In
addition, the international registry amendment to TRIPS for well-known marks
would mitigate consumer confusion in the worldwide marketplace, as only one
company would be authorized as the well-known mark holder. A consumer
looking to purchase Cohiba cigars in a country that trades with both the United
States and Cuba would no longer be flummoxed by encountering both
Cubatabaco’s and General Cigar’s mark.
3. Should the Commissioners Use the EU Trademark Approach as a
Guide?
While the establishment of the Community Trademark system in the EU
primarily has been viewed as a success,298 it is relevant to ask if a similar
system could be duplicated worldwide, without some of the characteristics in
place that make the EU so unique. Part Three of the European Community
Treaty sets out the four freedoms that define the EU: free movement of goods,
workers, establishment and the provision of services, and capital.299 These
foundational principles are so vital to the EU that the European Court of
Justice has noted that the fundamental interests of trademark protection must
be reconciled “with those of free movement of goods and freedom to provide
services in the common market in such a way that trade mark rights are able to
298
299

See supra Part I.B.3.b.i.
PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 605 (4th ed. 2008).
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fulfil [sic] their essential role in the system of undistorted competition which
the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain.”300 Therefore, the goal of
harmonizing trademarks through the Community Trademark System as another
means of coordinating European states as a single market for the free
movement of goods certainly seems to align with the unified structure of the
European Community.
Despite the advantages inherent in the European Community’s different
structure and in its profound emphasis on the free movement of goods, a crossborder registry for well-known marks could succeed on a wider scale.
Similarly to the European Community Treaty, the TRIPS Agreement itself is
primarily concerned with enhancing trade among member states.301 In its
preamble, TRIPS expresses the goal of member states to “reduce distortions
and impediments to international trade . . . and to ensure that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade.”302 Therefore, while all of the signatory states of
TRIPS may not function as one cohesive “community,” as is the case in the
EU, all of the signatory states have expressed a desire to tear down trade
barriers. Accordingly, the proposed TRIPS amendment that this Comment
advocates seemingly would provide for a more seamless and efficient
registration system for marks that have achieved such renown that they are
well known across borders.
While the suggestion of an international registry for well-known marks as
an amendment to TRIPS seems easy, the real question remains whether
countries have an incentive to sign on to the amended agreement and sacrifice
some of their intellectual-property autonomy. The United States, as the country
that stands to lose the most if international intellectual property standards are
violated, would need to be persuaded that such an amendment would primarily
serve to protect its thousands of well-known marks, such as those of Nike,
Starbucks, McDonalds, and others, and that such protection is worth a loss of
sovereignty. Perhaps a reminder of the problems that the United States
encountered in South Africa would persuade lawmakers of the benefits of
signing on to such an amendment. During the U.S. embargo with South Africa
as a protest of the county’s apartheid regime, U.S. companies were prevented

300 Case C-63/97, Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v. Ronald Karel
Deenik, 1999 E.C.R. I-947, ¶ 62.
301 See TRIPS, supra note 19, pmbl.
302 Id.
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from filing trademark applications in South Africa.303 When the embargo
ended, scores of U.S. companies discovered that their well-known marks had
been appropriated by South African companies who registered the marks as a
means of profiting from the U.S. businesses’ reputations.304 The expense that it
took for the U.S. companies to recover their marks in South Africa could have
been avoided if an international registry for well-known marks existed that
superseded temporary political considerations, embargoes, or other forms of
disputes between countries.
B. An International Registry: Promoting “Clean Hands” in Trademark
Disputes
The amendment calling for the creation of the international registry for
well-known marks would help emphasize the “unclean hands” doctrine in
international trademark jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined
unclean hands as “any willful act concerning the cause of action which
rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct.”305 In
applying for trademarks for Bacardi’s version of Havana Club rum and
General Cigar’s Cohiba cigars with the knowledge that Cuban products
bearing the marks would have been able to enter into the U.S. market if not for
the embargo, both Bacardi and General Cigar can be said to have acted with
unclean hands. An international registry for well-known marks would forbid
these companies from using an embargo or other temporary domestic law or
resolution as a means of circumventing traditional intellectual property
principles and agreements.
Courts do not traditionally analyze instances of good faith or bad faith
when ruling on trademark disputes.306 In light of the behavior exhibited by
several U.S. companies in relying on the embargo and appropriating the wellknown marks of Cuban entities, the time has come for “bad faith” to earn a
more prominent place in trademark jurisprudence. The European Court of
Justice recently clarified the meaning of bad faith in EU trademark law.307 The
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) established a three-part test for bad faith in
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See Examination of Section 211 Hearing, supra note 156, at 6 (testimony of William R. Reinsch).
See id. (listing Burger King, Toys “R” Us, and Victoria’s Secret as some of the affected companies).
305 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945).
306 See Stephanie Bodoni, Lindt Bunny Rivals Must Show Bad Faith, EU Court Says, BLOOMBERG (June
11, 2009, 11:25 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=afcUz6AUrtic; supra Part
I.B.3.a.
307 Charles Forelle, For Chocolate Bunny, It’s Still Legal Limbo, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009, at B8.
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a case involving Lindt, a Swiss chocolatier which secured a Community
Trademark in 2000 for the shape of its gold-wrapped chocolate bunny, and
Hauswirth, an Austrian competitor that had sold its own similar chocolate
bunny since 1962.308 Although Lindt originally sued Hauswirth for infringing
its trademark, Hauswirth responded with a countersuit that claimed Lindt’s
trademark was filed in bad faith, as the company knew about Hauswirth’s
more-than-five decades of use, and the trademark therefore should have been
deemed invalid.309 According to the ECJ’s ruling, for bad faith to exist in the
filing of a trademark, the trademark applicant must know that the mark it seeks
to protect already exists in the marketplace, the applicant must apply for the
trademark with the intent of blocking its rival, and the product must have other
legal protections.310 However, the ECJ also held that, in addition to the
multifactor test, an assessment of bad faith depends on the specific
circumstances of each case.311 The case has been remanded to the Austrian
court of first instance, where Lindt has been asked to supply evidence showing
how well known their chocolate bunnies were among relevant consumers in
the marketplace in 2000, and lawyers do not expect a decision in the case
before 2012.312 Hauswirth, the Austrian chocolate bunny maker, believes the
ECJ’s decision means it can prove Lindt’s bad faith by showing that the Swiss
chocolatier should have known about Hauswirth’s existence when it filed a
trademark application; however, it seems as though the ECJ’s ruling calls for a
wider analysis of the facts of each case in determining whether a trademark can
be invalidated due to bad faith.313
If U.S. courts had adopted the ECJ’s multifactor framework for bad faith
alone, without also analyzing the specific circumstances of each case, Bacardi
and General Cigar would have violated the principle. Both companies knew
that the products existed in Cuba when they filed a trademark application in the
United States, but they proceeded with the hopes of establishing the rights to
the products in the United States and blocking the Cuban entities from ever
using their trademarks in the United States. This behavior seems to reflect the
308 Case C-529/07, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli v. Franz Hauswirth, 2009 E.C.R. I-04893; see
Bodoni, supra note 306.
309 See Forelle, supra note 307.
310 See id.
311 See Bodoni, supra note 306.
312 Birgit Clark, “Easter Bunnies’ Case” Back at the Austrian Court of First Instance, MARQUES CLASS
46 (Feb. 22, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://www.marques.org/class46/Default.asp?D_A=20100222.
313 See Bodoni, supra note 306 (quoting Alexander Tsoutsanis, an intellectual property lawyer at DLA
Piper, stating that “the bottom line is that the specific facts and merits of each case will determine whether the
applied trademark may be invalidated on the grounds of bad faith”).
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core tenet of bad faith, and it also could lead to a strong likelihood of consumer
confusion in having the same mark represent different products worldwide.
With a binding international registry for well-known marks and a U.S.
court system that relied on equitable principles of international intellectual
property rights, including the consideration of unclean hands and bad faith, a
future embargo that mirrors the current U.S.-Cuba trade restrictions would not
lead to a similar impact on trademark rights between the two nations at the
center of the conflict.
CONCLUSION
Since the 1883 enactment of the Paris Convention,314 countries have
realized that the importance of preventing consumer confusion in a worldwide
marketplace means that trademark law’s focus on territoriality must be subject
to certain exceptions. The signatory states of the Paris Convention and
TRIPS315 are supposed to subscribe to the belief that marks that have achieved
well-known status should receive heightened protection against imitations,
even if the original marks have not been used in commerce in every signatory
state. The policies inherent to these agreements seem uncontroversial when all
signatory states cooperate as allies, but trouble exists when nations fall out of
line.
A dictator who illegally confiscates the property of his people, jails
dissenters on vague charges, and even allows prisoners to die by not
intervening in hunger strikes should not be embraced in the United States or in
the worldwide community of nations. However, this Comment contends that
the United States can punish Cuba’s transgressions without impacting the
arena of international intellectual property rights, primarily by maintaining the
embargo as punishment for Cuba’s human rights abuses while repealing the
controversial Section 211. The United States, as the world’s largest exporter of
intellectual property—and especially of well-known trademarks—must tread
carefully in approving laws such as Section 211 that violate intellectual
property treaties and call for discriminatory treatment of one country. United
States lawmakers must determine if continuing to punish Cuba’s communist
government by prohibiting the registration of marks such as those of Havana

314
315

See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 61.
TRIPS, supra note 19.
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Club rum and Cohiba cigars is worth the risk of the example that such actions
set for the rest of the world.316
Still, lawmakers face a difficult balancing act, and the influx of lobbyists
and special interest groups can easily sway views.317 Because no simple
solution exists in the conundrum of whether to recognize well-known
trademarks emanating from a rogue state, this Comment pushes for the
creation of a permanent, higher power that would take the decision out of the
hands of individual nations and instead rely on a separate international
framework existing in times of war and in times of peace. The nations that
adopted the TRIPS Agreement have recognized the need for common
international trade rules for intellectual property rights. An amendment
creating an international registry for the controversial trademark area of wellknown marks would further the overall mission of TRIPS by targeting—and
restricting—the enhanced potential for consumer confusion that now exists in a
marketplace that has expanded to a worldwide reach.
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